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* 
 
We study gender differences in the willingness to compete in a large-scale experiment with 
1,035 children and teenagers, aged three to eighteen years. Using an easy math task for 
children older than eight years and a running task for the younger ones we find that boys are 
much more likely to enter a tournament than girls across the whole age spectrum considered 
here. This gender gap is observed already with three-year olds, indicating that gender 
differences in competitiveness emerge very early in life. The gap is robust to controlling for 
gender differences in risk attitudes and overconfidence. 
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1  Introduction 
In order to be successful on labor markets with respect to getting more attractive and 
better paid jobs it is not only important to acquire human and social capital, but it is also 
essential to feel comfortable in competitive environments and accept the challenge of 
competition instead of shying away from it. Recent research has documented strong 
differences between men and women as far as the willingness to compete and the 
performance in competitive situations is concerned. Many studies have shown that men often 
react more strongly to competitive pressure than women, and that women are more likely to 
shy away from competition, even when they are equally qualified (e.g., Gneezy, Niederle and 
Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Datta Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval, 2005; 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010; Booth and Nolen, 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; 
Gneezy, Leonard and List, 2009; Cason, Masters and Sheremeta, 2010; Dohmen and Falk, 
2010; Niederle, Segal and Vesterlund, 2010; Wozniak, Harbaugh and Mayr, 2010). These 
gender differences in competitiveness may at least partly contribute to the persistent gender 
gap in wages and top-level positions on the labor market (see, for instance, Altonji and Blank, 
1999; Blau and Kahn, 2000; Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer, 2007; Blau, Ferber and Winkler, 2010). 
Hence, in order to deal with differences in competitiveness as one source for gender 
gaps on the labor market it is important to examine where these differences come from and 
how they might evolve over time. Recent work – that will be discussed in more detail below – 
provides first evidence on the influence of culture (Gneezy et al., 2009), social learning 
(Booth and Nolen, 2009) or hormones (Wozniak et al., 2010). No study has investigated 
gender differences in competitiveness from early childhood to the late teenage years, though. 
Nothing is known so far as to whether the gender gap in competitiveness emerges relatively 
early or late in the course of life. Gaining knowledge about the periods in life in which a 
gender gap in competitiveness exists is a precondition, however, to tailor the timing and type 
of suitable policy interventions to narrow down or even close this gap, with the aim of 
providing women with better chances on labor markets later on in life. 
In this paper, we present a large-scale experiment with 1,035 children and teenagers, 
aged three to eighteen years, from three kindergartens and eight schools in the state of Tyrol 
in the Western part of Austria. It is the most comprehensive experiment in terms of sample 
size and age coverage, so far, that examines gender differences in the willingness to compete. 
In the experiment, children and teenagers could choose between performing a (math or   2
running) task under a competitive or non-competitive payment scheme. We find already in 
our youngest age group of three-year old children that boys are significantly more likely than 
girls to choose the competitive scheme. In fact, this gender gap persists in all age groups 
covered in our sample, and it is robust to controlling for gender differences in risk attitudes 
and overconfidence. This main result indicates that the gender gap in competitiveness exists 
already very early in life, and does not change notably after the age of three years. Given the 
young age of three years from which on we find persistent gender differences, our findings 
are consistent both with an explanation that favors the impact of nurture – in the form of 
infants’ education as well as social and cultural learning – and an explanation that draws on 
the power of nature – in the form of biological factors. Recent papers have found support both 
for nature and nurture in studies with adults. 
Gneezy et al. (2009) have shown that gender differences in competitive behavior and 
the willingness to compete are strongly affected by cultural conditions. They conducted 
experiments with adult members of a patriarchal tribe in Tanzania and a matrilineal tribe in 
India. In the matrilineal tribe of the Khasi, the youngest daughter in a household is always 
heir to the parents’ fortune and, in practice, the husband always moves into the wife’s 
household. The Gneezy et al. (2009) experiment consisted of a single stage, where subjects 
had to toss tennis balls into a bucket. Before performing the task subjects had to choose one of 
two possible payment schemes, either a piece rate per successful shot or a tournament scheme 
with higher incentives, but the possibility of earning nothing in case of losing the tournament. 
Subjects were not informed about their competitor’s identity and gender. Gneezy et al. (2009) 
found that in the matrilineal culture more women than men chose the tournament, while in the 
patriarchal culture more men than women chose the competitive payment scheme (similar to 
what is known from experiments in highly industrialized states; see, e.g., Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). While these results do not rule out the possibility that nature (such as 
genetic predispositions and physiological factors) have a strong impact on gender differences 
in competition, they show that the social framework prevalent in a specific culture plays an 
important role for the behavior of adults in competitive environments. 
The first contribution on the influence of biological factors on the gender gap in 
competition is a very recent paper by Wozniak et al. (2010). They investigate biological 
explanations for the observed gender differences by examining how (adult) women’s 
competitive choices change with hormonal fluctuations. While Wozniak et al. (2010) can   3
replicate the finding that men are more likely to choose competitive compensation schemes
1, 
they also find that hormonal fluctuations during the menstrual cycle have a significant impact 
on the choices of women. During their low-hormone phase women are less likely to enter 
competitive environments than women in a non-low-hormone phase of the menstrual cycle. 
This shows that biological factors can influence the size of the gender gap in the willingness 
to compete. 
Compared to both Gneezy et al. (2009) and Wozniak et al. (2010) our paper is 
different through its use of a subject pool of children and teenagers who are three to eighteen 
years old. Despite this fact, our paper should be considered as complementary to their 
approaches. In the life-span from three to eighteen years important social and biological 
changes take place (see, e.g., Kail and Cavanaugh, 2010). Children have to enter the (public) 
education system and get exposed to socialization and social learning from outside of the own 
family. The body changes rapidly and faces many biological and cognitive challenges (such 
as puberty) in the transition to adolescence and adulthood. We are interested in whether we 
can detect changes in the behavior of boys and girls in competitive environments in this 
important period of life, in particular whether the gender gap reported for adults is persistent 
also in young children and teenagers. 
Of course, we are not the first ones to present an experiment on the behavior of 
children and teenagers in competition. Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) have shown for a sample 
of 240 nine- to ten-year old Israeli children that boys increase their performance in a 40 
meters sprint more when competing against another child – instead of running alone – than 
girls do. Recently, Dreber, von Essen and Ranehill (2010) have not been able to replicate this 
gender difference in response to competition (in running, skipping rope or dancing) in a 
sample of 438 eight- to ten-year old Swedish children. Dreber et al. (2010) argue that one 
reason for the lack of a gender difference might be the very egalitarian treatment of men and 
women in the Swedish society, lending support to the general finding in Gneezy et al. (2009) 
that culture (and thus social norms) are important for the size and direction of the gender gap 
in competition. Whereas Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) and Dreber et al. (2010) have studied 
how girls and boys change their behavior when they are actually exposed to competition, a 
previous step in this process is whether girls and boys are equally likely to enter competition. 
                                                 
1 This holds true for both a word task and a math task, and the gap is also robust to repetition several days later. 
The occurrence of the gender gap in a word task – which is a stereotype female task – is in contrast to findings 
by Günther et al. (2009) who found a gender gap in a math task, but not in a word task. It is interesting to note 
that Wozniak et al. (2010) also examine the gender gap in a treatment where continuous relative performance 
feedback is given, rather than only at the end of the experiment as is typically the case. In the treatment with 
relative performance feedback the gender gap becomes much smaller and insignificant, indicating that the 
information conditions are important when decisions for entry into competition are due.   4
Booth and Nolen (2009) have examined this issue by letting 260 fifteen-year old British 
teenagers choose whether they want to be paid in a maze-solving task according to a 
tournament or piece rate scheme. The twist in their study is that these children attended either 
a single-sex or coeducational school. In general, Booth and Nolen (2009) replicate a gender 
gap in competition entry decisions by observing that girls choose the tournament scheme less 
often than boys (except when girls compete only against other girls). However, they report a 
behavioral difference between girls from coeducational schools and from single-sex schools. 
Girls from single-sex schools are more likely to enter competition than coeducational girls. 
Although there are subtle issues of self-selection (of different types of girls into different 
school types) that make this latter result vulnerable to criticism (see, e.g., Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2010), the results of Booth and Nolen seem to support the conclusion that social 
learning is important. 
Compared to these earlier studies that have run experiments with children, our paper is 
the first one to cover an age range of fifteen years from early childhood to the late teenage 
years, while earlier studies have had at most two years of age difference in their sample. Our 
sample is also at least twice as large as the samples used in previous studies, thus increasing 
the validity of results. Most importantly, no previous study has examined the behavior of 
children younger than eight years old, although the main development of a human subject’s 
character traits – that might well include one’s attitude towards competition – takes place in 
the first few years of life (Kail and Cavanaugh, 2010). Hence, it seems particularly important 
to examine the existence of a gender gap in young children’s willingness to compete. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we explain the experimental 
design of the math task that was used for nine- to eighteen-year old children and teenagers. 
The results for this task are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce the design and 
procedure of the running task for our three- to eight-year old participants. Since competing in 
math tasks is not feasible for the youngest participants, we chose running as a more natural 
and familiar task for this second experiment. The results for the running task are reported in 
Section 5. Section 6 discusses our overall findings from both experiments and concludes the 
paper. 
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2  Design of Experiment I: Competition in a Math Task (9- to 18-Year 
Old Children) 
The experimental design of our first experiment builds on Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007). Like them we used a simple math task of adding up two-digit numbers as the 
experimental task. The reason for choosing a math task was not only that we follow the 
literature (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) to make comparisons to earlier studies with adults 
easier, but also because math test scores serve as a good predictor of future income (see, e.g., 
Murnane et al., 2000; Weinberger, 2001). Moreover, there are typically no gender differences 
in such easy math tasks (Hyde et al., 2008), making it a priori less likely to find gender 
differences in the willingness to compete. 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four 
persons. The group assignment was fixed for all four stages of the experiment.
2 Each stage 
was only explained after the previous one had been finished. The instructions were explained 
verbally, following a fixed written script (see Appendix A1). Questions were answered 
privately. Participants had to perform the task by entering their solutions on a keyboard (using 
zTree; Fischbacher, 2007). Hence, before the experiment started, all participants were given 
enough time to acquaint themselves with the keyboard and the mouse, and before Stage 1 
there was also a one-minute training sequence. There was no feedback (concerning the 
tournament outcome) given until the very end of the experiment in order to avoid past 
experiences influencing future choices. At the end of each stage participants were only 
informed about the number of calculations they had worked on and how many of them had 
been correct. The sequence of stages was as follows: 
Stage 1 – Piece rate: Each participant received €0.50 for each calculation that was 
correctly solved within the limit of two minutes.
3 There was no competition involved in this 
stage. 
Stage 2 – Tournament: Here participants had to compete in the same task against the 
three other group members. The group member who solved the most calculations correctly in 
Stage 2 was paid €2.00 for each of them. The other three group members received nothing. 
Ties were broken randomly (also in the subsequent stages). 
                                                 
2 Note that subjects were informed that the other three group members were randomly sampled from the entire 
pool of students in the schools involved in this project. However, it was stressed that all members within 
groups would attend the same grade. 
3 Given that older children can solve more calculations correctly within the time limit of two minutes (see results 
section below), the fixed payment per correct solution across all age groups yields higher total payoffs for 
older subjects.   6
Stage 3 – Choice of compensation scheme for future performance: Every group 
member could choose whether (s)he wanted to solve the calculations under a piece rate 
scheme (as in Stage 1, receiving €0.50 per correct solution) or a tournament scheme (as in 
Stage 2). If the tournament was chosen, then a subject’s performance in Stage 3 was 
compared to the other group members’ performance in Stage 2.
4 Winners received again 
€2.00 per correct solution, losers nothing. 
Stage 4 – Choice of compensation scheme for past performance: Subjects did not 
have to perform the math task in this stage, but had to choose between a piece rate and 
tournament scheme for their past performance in Stage 1. The piece rate scheme paid €0.50 
per correct solution that was achieved in Stage 1. The tournament scheme paid €2.00 per 
correct solution if a subject’s Stage 1 performance was the best in his/her group. Otherwise 
he/she received nothing. This stage is a control condition that allows us to investigate whether 
the gender gap in tournament entrance persists even when no real performance is required. 
Elicitation of expected ranks: After the completion of Stage 4 participants were 
asked about their expected rank in their group of four members both for their performance in 
Stage 1 and in Stage 2. An expectation of rank 1 would indicate that a participant expected to 
be the best performer in his/her group in a particular stage. Each correct expectation was paid 
€0.50. Note that the question on expectations was only introduced at the very end. Hence, 
hedging (for instance by performing particularly poorly in Stage 2 in order to win for sure 
€0.50 by expecting rank 4 for this stage) was not possible. 
At the end of the experiment one stage was randomly selected for payment by letting 
one student draw one of four numbered cards. By paying only one stage we wanted to avoid 
income effects. The expectations were paid in any case. In addition to their performance-
related payoff each participant received a show-up fee of €1.00. The overall payoff was 
distributed several days after the experiment by a school’s secretary (who was not involved in 
the experiment) in sealed envelopes marked with a six digit code only known to students in 
order to preserve anonymity. 
The experiment was run in three elementary and four grammar schools in Innsbruck, 
Schwaz and Völs, three close-by cities in the federal state of Tyrol in the Western part of 
                                                 
4 Using the other group members’ past performance has several advantages. First, tournament entry decisions do 
not depend on a subject’s expectation about the other members’ entry decisions, but only on the subject’s 
beliefs about her/his own ability and the ability of the other group members in Stage 2. Second, Stage 2 
performances are competitive performances, and thus a subject competes against others when they were also 
exposed to a competitive payment scheme. Third, entering competition does not impose externalities on 
others. In principle, this means that Stage 3 is an individual decision making problem. Note that this scheme 
also implies that it is possible that all group members entering the competition in Stage 3 may win or all lose 
since they are competing against the others’ performance in Stage 2.   7
Austria. Sessions were conducted between January and March 2009. This experiment was 
part of a larger project with a series of experiments in which we visited the involved schools 
several times in a period of two years, exposing children to different experimental tasks (in 
order to study, e.g., their social preferences – see Sutter et al., 2010a – or their risk and time 
preferences – see Sutter et al., 2010b). The whole project was approved by the central school 
administration board of Tyrol and the headmasters of the selected schools. All parents of 
involved children and teenagers were informed in a letter about the project and its aim to 
study economic decision making of children, without revealing any specific details or 
experimental tasks, though. Parents were given the option to opt out their child from the 
project, and five out of more than 700 did so. All other parents consented. Children and 
teenagers were also instructed that participation was completely voluntary. Since they were 
told that they could earn some money in the experiments, no single student refused to 
participate in any of the experiments. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In total, we had 717 participants from 37 different classes from 5 different grades 
(grades 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12). The youngest participants were nine to ten years old (4
th grade), 
and the oldest ones seventeen to eighteen years (12
th grade). We used a between-subjects 
design with two treatments. In the MIXED treatment they were told that each group of four 
members would have exactly two boys and two girls. In the SINGLE-SEX treatment they 
were told that each group consisted of four members of their own gender. Within a given 
class, all students faced the same treatment. In both treatments students were informed that 
their other three group members would be randomly drawn from the pool of students in any of 
the participating schools who were in the same grade as they were in. Table 1 summarizes the 
distribution of participants by age, gender and treatment. Overall, an experimental session 
lasted about 50 minutes, and participants earned on average €6.58 (including the €1 show-up 
fee). 
   8
3  Results of Experiment I (9- to 18-Year Old Children) 
3.1  Performance and Expected Ranks in Stages 1 and 2 
Panels (A) and (B) of Figure 1 show the average performance of boys and girls in 
Stage 1 (piece rate) and Stage 2 (compulsory tournament). Generally we see an almost linear 
increase in the number of problems solved correctly with age. As expected, participants get 
more efficient in adding two-digit numbers when they get older. Comparing panels (A) and 
(B) also reveals that the average performance is higher under the tournament scheme (Stage 
2) than the piece rate (Stage 1), and the increase in performance is significant (p < 0.02 for 
each gender within each age group; Wilcoxon signed rank tests). The increase from Stage 1 to 
Stage 2 is perhaps not only due to the higher incentives under the tournament scheme, but also 
to some learning going on. 
 
Figure 1 and Table 2 about here 
 
Panels (A) and (B) of Figure 1 reveal that there are only very small differences 
between girls and boys. In Table 2 we present OLS-regressions with the number of correct 
answers in Stage 1 (models 1a and 1b) and in Stage 2 (models 2a and 2b) as dependent 
variables.
5 We see from Table 2 that there are no significant differences in the performance of 
girls and boys, neither in Stage 1 nor in Stage 2, even when accounting for the treatment 
(dummy for the Single-Sex treatment) and an interaction term of Single-Sex and Female. 
Running a series of Mann-Whitney U-tests shows that there are also no significant gender 
differences concerning the quality of effort, measured as the relative frequency of correct 
answers in each stage of the experiment.
6 On average, the relative frequency of correct 
answers is 87%.
7 Hence, differences in the ability to perform in the math task can be ruled out 
to explain possible gender differences in the willingness to choose the tournament in Stage 3. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
                                                 
5 We have also run all models in Table 2 as Poisson regressions in order to account for the fact that the 
dependent variable can only have integer values. All main results stay the same. The same holds true also for 
Table 4 below. 
6 There is a single exception for Stage 2 in the group of thirteen-/fourteen-year olds, where males have a 
significantly higher frequency of correct answers. 
7 We have also checked whether the increase in performance from Stage 1 to Stage 2 differs across gender (as 
the results of Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004, for a running task might suggest). However, we find no gender 
differences in the increase of performance either, nor do we find any influence of age or treatment on the 
change in performance across the first two stages (see the regressions in Table B.1 in Appendix B).   9
 
Recall that at the end of this experiment we asked subjects about their expected ranks 
in Stages 1 and 2. A rank of 1 indicates an expectation to be the best performer in the group, 
while a rank of 4 means to be the worst one. Figure 2 shows the average expectations of girls 
and boys in each age group. Except for a single case, girls have on average more pessimistic 
expectations than boys, both in the non-competitive Stage 1 and the competitive Stage 2. 
Of course, if subjects had well-calibrated expectations, then the average expected rank 
would have to be 2.5. However, Figure 2 reveals that subjects are on average overconfident 
and boys are even more so than girls. The gender difference in overconfidence is clearly 
confirmed in ordered probit regressions (shown in Appendix B, Tables B.2 and B.3). Both for 
the expected rank in Stage 1 and in Stage 2 we find that girls’ estimated expectation is on 
average roughly 0.4 ranks worse than that of boys. This significant effect is robust to 
controlling for the actual performance (that did not differ between girls and boys) and age 
(with younger children being more overconfident). 
 
3.2  Entry into the Tournament and Subsequent Performance 
Figure 3 shows the entry rates of girls and boys into the tournament payment scheme 
in Stage 3 of the experiment. Although performance in Stages 1 and 2 was practically 
identical, the gender differences in tournament entry are striking. Across all age groups, 19% 
of girls, but 40% of boys, choose to enter the tournament (p < 0.001; χ²-test). 
 
Figure 3 and Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 reports the results of a series of probit regressions where the dependent 
variable is coded 1 if a subject chooses to enter the competition in Stage 3, and 0 otherwise. 
The baseline specification controls for gender and age effects (1a) as well as treatment effects 
by including a dummy for the single-sex treatment (Single-Sex) and an interaction term of 
gender and treatment (Single-Sex*female) (1b). We find a strong gender effect, with a roughly 
20 percentage points lower entry rate of girls. The treatment itself as well as the interaction of   10
treatment and gender do not have a significant effect, though.
8 Age seems to have some 
influence, but often insignificantly, as becomes also clear from the following regressions.
9 
Specifications (2a) and (2b) add as further controls a subject’s actual performance in 
Stage 2 (Correct 2) and the absolute increase in performance from Stage 1 to Stage 2 (Correct 
2 – Correct 1). The latter shall capture a subject’s potential of increasing performance under 
competition. Not surprisingly, the actual performance has a positive impact on tournament 
entry. For each additional problem solved the likelihood of entering the tournament increases 
by roughly three percentage points. The increase in performance from Stage 1 to Stage 2 has 
no predictive power. The gender gap, however, remains significant and of equal size even 
after the inclusion of these additional controls. 
In specifications (3a) and (3b) we also consider the expected rank for Stage 2 as 
explanatory variable, as this shall capture a subject’s expected relative performance under a 
competitive payment scheme. Since in the tournament it’s only crucial to win (or expect to 
win), we include a dummy for an expected rank of 1 (Rank 2 = 1) in order to see how an 
expectation to win affects behavior. We see that subjects who expect to win are about 33 
percentage points more likely to enter the tournament. The number of correct answers in 
Stage 2 is still significantly positive, and, most importantly, the gender gap persists even after 
controlling for expectations. Recall from the previous subsection that there are significant 
gender differences in the expected rank. Including the expectation to win reduces the marginal 
effect of the Female-dummy slightly by about four percentage points. Hence, different 
expectations can explain some part of the observed gender gap, but a substantial gap remains. 
In the final specifications (4a) and (4b) we add a subject’s math grade (Math) and 
his/her risk preference (Risk aversion) as independent variables. In the Austrian school system 
grades range from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). The risk preferences of subjects were determined in a 
different experiment (about six to ten months earlier) by letting them choose between a lottery 
and an increasing sure amount of money. From that we have constructed a variable that 
ranges from zero (strong risk loving) to one (strong risk aversion).
10 The results in columns 
(4a) and (4b) show that risk-averse subjects are significantly less likely to enter the 
                                                 
8 We have also run all regressions reported in Table 3 with an additional dummy for one girls-only school that is 
included in our sample. The dummy is never significantly different from zero, and its inclusion does not 
change our main results. 
9 Including a quadratic age term in the various specifications to capture the U-shape in Figure 3 does not change 
our main results either. 
10 More precisely, the lottery yielded a prize π > 0 or zero with a 50:50 chance and children had to indicate in a 
choice list whether they preferred the lottery or a safe amount that increased from π/20 to π in 20 steps of 
width π/20. From this we determined the interval including the certainty equivalent, took the midpoint of this 
interval and then calculated our measure of risk aversion as 1 – (certainty equivalent/prize π). See Sutter et al. 
(2010b) for more details.   11
tournament, and that subjects with better (i.e., lower) math grades are more likely to enter it. 
Most importantly, though, adding these further controls does not change our main result of a 
persistent and significant gender gap in the likelihood to enter the tournament.
11 
After having analyzed the decision to enter the tournament in Stage 3 we have a brief 
look at the performance in Stage 3. Panels (C) and (D) of Figure 1 show the average 
performance in Stage 3, once conditional on entering the tournament, and once overall. In 
general, those who enter the tournament have a better performance than those who don’t. This 
becomes also clear in columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 4 in which we regress the number of 
correct answers in Stage 3 on age, gender, treatment, and the decision to enter the tournament 
(Tournament 3). Those who choose the tournament solve about 1.5 problems more than those 
opting for the piece rate. Again we see an increase in performance with age, and it is 
noteworthy that in Stage 3 we even find significantly better performance for girls. 
 
Table 4 and Figure 4 about here 
 
Finally, we show in Figure 4 the decision in Stage 4 of the experiment. In this stage 
subjects had to decide whether to submit their performance in Stage 1 to a piece rate scheme 
or a tournament (against the other three team members). Figure 4 shows the relative frequency 
of choosing the tournament. Again, we see that boys enter the tournament much more often 
than girls, which largely replicates the findings of Stage 3. Thus we find female antipathy 
toward competitive environments not only in situations where subjects have to compete 
subsequently (as in Stage 3), but also when subjects have to decide on whether to compare 
their own past performance to someone else’s (as in Stage 4).
12 
As an intermediate summary of our first experiment we conclude that the gender gap 
in the willingness to enter competition in a tournament prevails already by the age of nine 
years and persists throughout the teenage-years. Given this persistent gap already at this 
young age we devised an experiment that could be run with even younger children to examine 
whether the gap would persist even at a younger age. 
 
                                                 
11 It seems interesting to note that adding a measure for ambiguity aversion (that has also been collected in Sutter 
et al., 2010b) does not change any of the results in colums (4a) and (4b) in Table 3 and that ambiguity aversion 
is insignificant. Hence, the gender gap is not driven by ambiguity aversion either. Additional regressions also 
show that some other socio-demographic variables, such as the amount of a subject’s weekly pocket money, 
the five domains of the BIG 5 personality test (taking a German version of Borkenau and Ostendorf, 2008), a 
psychological measure for Machiavellism, or distributional preferences have no influence on the decision to 
enter the tournament. 
12 Table B.4 in Appendix B provides some regressions on the determinants for choosing the tournament in Stage 
4, showing again a large and significant gender gap.   12
4  Design of Experiment II: Competition in a Running Task (3- to 8-
Year Old Children) 
The second experiment modifies the original design of Gneezy and Rustichini (2004). 
We let children aged three to eight years run a distance of 30 meters in their Kindergarten’s or 
school’s gym. Research has shown that there are no systematic gender differences in short 
sprints at the age level of our participants (see, e.g., Papaiakovou et al., 2009). Hence, like our 
math task, this task does not imply an a priori advantage of boys over girls with respect to 
objective performance. 
The experiment consisted of two stages, with an intermediate elicitation of 
expectations. In both stages participants could earn points depending on their performance. 
After the experiment, these points could be exchanged for small presents, such as sweets, 
stickers, balloons, or pencils. These presents were shown to the children at the beginning of 
the experiment. Each item “cost” one point in the experiment, and we chose the items such 
that they were roughly of equal monetary value.
13 The two stages of the experiment were as 
follows: 
Stage 1 – Running on your own: Children were asked to run 30 meters in their gym 
as fast as possible. Children received no feedback on their own time and their relative position 
to the other children in their cohort until the end of the experiment, but were told that all 
children who were relatively quick (all with a below-median runtime) would earn two points, 
while the others (with an above-median runtime) would earn one point.
14 
Stage 2 – Choice of compensation scheme for future performance: In Stage 2 
children could choose whether to repeat the running task by either running again on their own, 
or by competing against another child in their group (of same age). Children were told that in 
case of competition they would be matched with a child whose runtime in Stage 1 was 
approximately the same as his/her own and who also wanted to run against another child. The 
payment scheme was as follows: If running on his/her own, a child could earn two 
experimental points if his/her time was better than the median of Stage 1, and one point 
otherwise. In the competition, these points would be doubled for the winner, while the loser 
                                                 
13 Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) study the rational choice behavior of children and teenagers and show that 
even young children make rational consumption choices. Hence, we can be confident that the children in our 
experiment can make rational choices in exchanging their points into goods. 
14 In fact, although it’s an individual task in Stage 1, the reward depends also on others’ performance. Given that 
the groups of children were relatively large (15 to 20 children) it was next to impossible for children to know 
their relative standing exactly. We had considered using a fixed, and pre-announced, time instead of a median-
split, but – after consulting with Kindergarten teachers – it became clear that children in Kindergarten have 
difficulties with the measurement of time in seconds, while they can perfectly understand to be relatively faster 
or slower. Hence, we opted for using a median-split.   13
would not earn any points. This means that a winner earned four points if his/her time was 
below the median of Stage 1, but two points otherwise. 
Asking for expected ranks: After having explained the rules for Stage 2, but before 
performing the task, children were asked about their beliefs concerning their performance in 
Stage 1, i.e., whether they were in the relatively faster or slower group. We also asked them 
about their expectation for Stage 2, i.e., whether they expected to win the competition or not. 
Note that we also asked those children who opted out of the competition in Stage 2 about their 
(hypothetical) expectation whether or not they would have won the competition if they had 
had to compete against another child. This was done in order to keep the conditions identical 
for all children. Note that in this experiment we asked about expectations before the actual 
competition. Since the competition in a running task is immediately resolved and obvious for 
the involved children it was impossible to ask about their expectations on relative 
performance after the fact. We did not pay any points for these expectations, though, in order 
to avoid that someone can hedge by stating an expectation to lose and then run slowly to lose 
the competition and earn some points from a correct expectation. 
The instructions for Stage 1 were carefully explained to all children in public, 
following a fixed script (see Appendix A2). The second stage was explained to each child 
individually and the experimenter checked for proper understanding of the task and the rules 
by letting each child repeat the rules. Only after repeating the rules the child had to make the 
decision about whether to run on his/her own or compete against another child and then state 
his/her expectations. 
This experiment was run in three Kindergartens and two elementary schools in 
Innsbruck and Schwaz. Sessions were conducted in May and June 2009 and May 2010 and 
took place in the regular gym classes (lasting 100 minutes). Upon approval of the central 
school administration board of Tyrol and the headmasters of the respective institutions, 
parents were informed in a letter that some members of the local university would attend gym 
classes to measure athletic performance. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Kindergarten starts when children turn three years old, and school entrance is at age 
six. This means that in Kindergarten there are three cohorts, (a) the three- to four-year old, 
(b), the four- to five-year old, and (c) the five- to six-year old. We ran the experiment with 
children in each of these cohorts. In total we had 243 children in Kindergarten. Sixteen of   14
them are excluded from the following analysis because they were not able to correctly repeat 
the rules for Stage 2. This leaves us with data from 227 children in Kindergarten. In order to 
bridge the age gap to the youngest participants in our math task (nine- to ten-year olds in 
experiment I) we also ran the second experiment in the second grade of two elementary 
schools. We had 91 participants in these schools. None of them had problems in repeating the 
rules for Stage 2. Therefore, we have a total of 318 children from three to eight years for our 
analysis of the running task. Table 5 summarizes the number of girls and boys in the different 
cohorts. 
 
5  Results of Experiment II (3- to 8-Year Old Children) 
5.1  Actual and Expected Relative Performance 
Figure 5 shows the average running times for girls and boys in the different age 
groups. In all panels of Figure 5 we note an almost linear increase in speed across the four age 
groups. In Stage 1, i.e. panel (A), girls are slightly slower than boys, in particular in the 
youngest age group of three- to four-year olds. Panel (C) provides the running times 
contingent on gender and a subject’s decision to enter competition or not. Those running 
against another child (see the straight lines) are always faster than those running on their own. 
Figure 5 and Table 6 about here 
 
These observations are confirmed in the OLS-regressions reported in Table 6. Column 
(1) regresses the running time in Stage 1 on age and a gender dummy (Female). The 
coefficient for age shows that getting one year older reduces the time by roughly 0.8 seconds. 
The gender dummy is significant, meaning that girls are slower. However, this effect is only 
driven by the youngest age group of three- to four-year olds. Adding a dummy for this group 
would make Female insignificant. Columns (2) and (3) consider the running times in Stage 2. 
When controlling for the decision to enter the tournament, gender is no longer significant. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
 
Before turning to the children’s decision whether or not to compete in Stage 2 we 
display in Figure 6 the average expectations about relative performance. Panel (A) shows the 
relative frequency with which children expect to be in the faster (instead of the slower) group 
in their session. We see a remarkable degree of overconfidence, with an average of 91% of   15
children in Kindergarten (age three to six) expecting to be in the faster group. While boys are 
on average slightly more overconfident, the gender difference is not significant (in a 
regression not reported here). Panel (B) of Figure 6 shows the relative frequency with which 
children expect to win the competition in Stage 2, conditional on whether subjects have 
actually chosen to compete (straight lines) or not (broken lines). The general pattern emerging 
from Panel (B) is that those who compete are clearly more confident to win. 
 
5.2  Entering Competition in Stage 2 
Despite the small differences in performance, we note from Figure 7 significant 
gender differences in the willingness to enter competition also in this experiment. Across all 
age groups, we find a difference of 15 percentage points in the relative frequency of boys and 
girls entering the competition (p < 0.01; χ²-test). 
 
Figure 7 and Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 reports the results from several probit regressions that confirm the insights 
from Figure 7. The dependent variable is a child’s decision to compete against another child 
in Stage 2. In column (1) we control for gender and age effects. The Female-dummy is 
significantly negative, and girls are estimated to be roughly 15 percentage points less likely to 
compete. In column (2) we add the running time in Stage 1 as a control that takes into account 
physical ability in this task. As expected, slower children are less likely to compete (by about 
6 percentage points). However, the gender gap remains significant and of similar size as in 
column (1). In column (3) we add children’s expectations as control. The expectation about 
winning has a strongly positive influence (raising the likelihood of entering by about 50 
percentage points). The Female-dummy, however, is still significant.
15 
We conclude from our second experiment that the gender gap in the willingness to 
compete can already be found in three- to four-year old children in Kindergarten. From this 
age on the gender gap is persistent. 
 
                                                 
15 Additional regressions show that socio-demographic variables, such as the number of siblings, birth order, or 
the relative height of a subject, have no significant influence on the decision to enter the tournament.   16
6  Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied the competitive behavior of 1,035 children and 
teenagers, aged three to eighteen years. In particular, we have studied whether the willingness 
to compete differs between boys and girls in the period of life covered in our sample.
16 A 
gender gap in the willingness to compete is well-documented for adults (e.g., Gneezy et al., 
2003, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2010), and it has received wide 
attention as a possible explanation for persistent gender gaps on labor markets, for instance 
with respect to wages or opportunities for promotion. While recent research has examined the 
role of culture (Gneezy et al., 2009) or hormones (Wozniak et al., 2010) – thereby addressing 
the issue of nature versus nurture – we have presented a large-scale experiment on the 
influence of age on competitiveness, covering the range from early childhood to the late 
teenage years. In this pre-adulthood period of life humans undergo important physiological 
changes in their body and are increasingly exposed to social institutions outside of their 
family, including the need to find one’s position in social networks (Kail and Cavanaugh, 
2010). Obviously, humans experience competitive situations not only on labor markets when 
they are adults, but also in childhood and adolescence (competing, for example, for friends to 
play with, for prizes in sports and arts contests, for attention of parents or teachers, and so on). 
Hence, competition is something that children and teenagers are familiar with. The question 
addressed in this paper is how likely girls and boys are to compete when there is an 
opportunity to opt out. 
We have used a simple math task (based on Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) for the 
nine- to eighteen-year olds and a running task (based on Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004) for the 
three- to eight-year olds. Like in the literature for adults, we find a persistent and large gender 
gap in the willingness to compete. Men are much more willing to enter a competition than 
women. This gender gap materializes already at the age of three- to four-year old 
Kindergarten children, and it continues to exist in all groups up to eighteen-year old 
teenagers. Both in the running task and in the math task the gender gap is approximately 15 to 
20 percentage points large. The size of the gap is largely robust to controlling for risk 
attitudes, treatment effects (whether competition is against members of the own or the 
                                                 
16 While working on this project we have become aware of a study by Andersen et al. (2010) who have examined 
the gender gap in a competitive task with children and teenagers of a patriarchal tribe in Tanzania (the Maasai) 
and a matrilineal tribe in India (the Khasi). They find that the gender gap only emerges around the age of 
twelve years in the tribal communities that they consider. In our study we find the gap to exist already at the 
age of three years. The very different background of the subject pools considered in both studies – a sample of 
children in Austria, one of the richest countries in the European Union, versus two tribes in what we would 
consider developing countries – might explain the slightly different findings.   17
opposite gender), performance in the task or different levels of overconfidence (with boys 
being, in general, more overconfident than girls). 
Given our findings of a persistent gender gap already from the age of three to four 
years on, one interesting route for future research is to devise tasks that can be performed with 
even younger children to see whether the gender gap in the willingness to compete emerges in 
the first three years of life or whether it seems to be kind of innate. The answer to these 
questions will shape the possible policy interventions – and the timing of interventions – that 
one might pursue in order to promote women in competitive situations. Recent studies of 
Niederle et al. (2010) and Balafoutas and Sutter (2010) have already shown for adults that 
different forms of affirmative action programs (like introducing quotas for female winners or 
by giving women a headstart in competition) induce women to compete more and that such 
programs do not seem to have noticeable efficiency costs – of passing by better qualified men 
– because they encourage in particular highly-qualified women to enter competition. While 
such programs are obviously successful in bridging an existing gap, it would perhaps be more 
desirable to close the gap right from the start, i.e. from early on in life. Which policies work 
best to achieve this aim is certainly an important task for future (interdisciplinary) research. 
   18
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of participants by age, gender and treatment in Experiment 
I (Math task) 
  Elementary school  Grammar school
+ 

















MIXED        
Female  42   47   42   25   29 
Male  51   56   33   25   23 
SINGLE-SEX        
Female     82   58   53   42 
Male     23   33   25   28 
ALL  (N=717)  93   208   166   128   122 
Notes: 









Table 2: OLS-regressions on performance in Stages 1 and 2 
Dependent variable  Explanatory 
variables  Correct Stage 1  Correct Stage 2 
 (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b) 
Age
+  0.601  **  0.591  **  0.683  **  0.670  ** 
 (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.052) 
Female 0.188  0.404  0.053  0.287 
 (0.223)  (0.288)  (0.257)  (0.326) 
Single-Sex   0.418    0.517 
   (0.353)    (0.417) 
Single-Sex*female   -0.525    -0.591 
   (0.466)    (0.538) 
#  Observations    717    717   717   717 
R-squared 0.22  0.22  0.21  0.22 
Notes: **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+ Exact age of subject in years and month.  
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Table 3: Probit regressions on the choice of compensation scheme in Stage 3 
Dependent variable  Explanatory 
variables  Competition in Stage 3 
 (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b) 
Age  0.013 *  0.017  *  -0.005   - 0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008) 
Female -0.216    **   -0.175  **  -0.223 **  -0.186 ** 
   (0.034)  (0.046)   (0.035)  (0.047)  
Single-Sex  -0.067    -0.079 
   (0.051)    (0.051) 
Single-Sex*female   -0.053    -0.041 
   (0.066)    (0.067) 
Correct 2       0.026  **  0.027  ** 
     (0.006)  (0.006) 
Correct 2 – Correct 1     -0.006  -0.006 
     (0.008)  (0.008) 
# Observations    717    717    717    717 
Notes: **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The table presents marginal effects of the coefficient. 
 
 




Competition in Stage 3 
 (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b) 
Age 0.005  0.010  0.014  0.017    * 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Female  -0.183  **  -0.148  **  -0.167  **  -0.135  ** 
 (0.035)  (0.048)  (0.036)  (0.048) 
Single-Sex   -0.092  -0.068 
   (0.051)  (0.052) 
Single-Sex*female   -0.035  -0.038 
   (0.068)  (0.068) 
Correct 2  0.014  *  0.014  *  0.012  0.012 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Correct 2 – Correct 1  -0.013  -0.013  -0.010  -0.010 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Rank 2 = 1
†  0.335  **  0.340  **  0.321  **  0.326  ** 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Math      -0.042  *  -0.037  * 
     (0.018)  (0.018) 
Risk aversion      -0.237  **  -0.216  ** 
     (0.071)  (0.071) 
# Observations    717    717    717    717 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
† This variable takes on the value 1 if a subject expects to win the tournament in Stage 2  
(the expected rank is equal to one), and 0 otherwise. 
The table presents marginal effects of the coefficient. 
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Table 4: OLS-regressions on performance in Stage 3 
Dependent variable  Explanatory 
variables Correct  Stage  3 
 (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b) 
Age  0.865  **  0.846  **  0.846  **  0.820  ** 
 (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.052) 
Female  0.341  0.647  *  0.664  *  0.929  ** 
 (0.258)  (0.317)  (0.266)  (0.316) 
Single-Sex   0.731    0.843    * 
   (0.434)    (0.426) 
Single-Sex*female   -0.791    -0.742 
   (0.550)    (0.540) 
Tournament 3      1.499  **  1.535  ** 
     (0.318)  (0.321) 
# Observations    717    717    717    717 
R-squared 0.30  0.31  0.33  0.33 






Table 5: Distribution of participants by age and gender in Experiment II 
(Running task) 
  Kindergarten Elementary  school 
Age (in years)  3/4  4/5  5/6  7/8 (2
nd grade) 
Female 38  38  45  44 
Male 42  28  36  47 







Table 6: OLS-regressions on performance in Stages 1 and 2 of Experiment II 
Explanatory Dependent  variable 
Variables  Running time 1  Running time 2  Running time 2 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age  -0.798  **  -0.832  **  -0.814  ** 
 (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Female  0.353  *  0.232  *  0.149 
 (0.138)  (0.114)  (0.113) 
Tournament     -0.562    ** 
     (0.116) 
# Observations    318    318    318 
R-squared                 0.48                 0.60                  0.63 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Competition Stage 2 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age 0.032  -0.012  0.016 
 (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.029) 
Female  -0.150  **  -0.132  *  -0.118  * 
 (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.059) 
Time 1    -0.056  *  -0.059  * 
   (0.024)  (0.025) 
Expectation on winning      0.496  ** 
the tournament      (0.057) 
# Observations    318    318  318 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The table presents marginal effects of the coefficient. 
† H0: female β + 4 / 3 *agegroup female β = 0. 
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Appendix A – Experimental instructions 
 
A1. Instructions for the math task (script for verbal explanation) 
Welcome to our game. Before we start, we will explain the rules of our game to you. 
From now on, please don’t speak to your neighbors and listen carefully. You can earn money 
in this game. The game consists of four different stages. At the end of the game we will 
randomly select one stage, which will be paid out by drawing one of these four numbered 
cards. You will receive the money in a sealed envelope labelled with your six digit personal 
code from the school’s secretary within the next days. For participating you will get an extra 
euro, which will also be included in the sealed envelope. It is important that you listen 
carefully now, in order that you understand the rules of our game. If you have any questions, 
we will answer them after we have explained the rules. Therefore, please raise your hand and 
we will come to you to answer your questions privately. 
In this game we will randomly form groups of four people. Each group will consist 
of two girls and two boys (four girls or four boys; depending on the treatment) from the same 
year. Furthermore, each group will consist of students from the four (three; in elementary 
schools) schools in Innsbruck and Schwaz (and Völs; in elementary schools) who are also 
participating in this research project. 
I will now explain the rules of the first stage: In the first stage you will have to add 
up two-digit numbers as fast as you can within a limit of two minutes. The numbers are 
randomly picked by the computer. All numbers between 10 and 99 are possible. Each 
problem consists of three two-digit numbers. Each of you will be provided with scratch paper, 
which you can use to assist you in your calculations. The use of a calculator is not allowed. 
As soon as you have typed in your solution to a problem, the computer will give you a new 
problem. At the end of the two minutes you will be able to see how many problems you have 
worked on and how many of them you have solved correctly. If Stage 1 is randomly selected 
for payment, each of you will receive €0.5 per correct problem solved. Before we start we will 
run an example-round. This round lasts for one minute and will not count for payment. 
I will now explain the rules for the second stage: This stage is similar to the first 
stage, except that the rules for the payment change. If the second stage is randomly selected 
for payment, the participant who correctly solves the largest number of problems in each 
group will receive €2 per correct solution. The three remaining people in each group will not 
get any money. In the case of ties among winners, the winner will be selected by chance 
among the best performers.   30
I will now explain the rules of the third stage: Again, you have to solve the same 
kind of problems as in Stage 1 and 2 within a limit of two minutes. However, before you do 
that you have to choose one of two payment options. You can either choose a payment 
scheme as in Stage 1, which we call a piece rate scheme, or a payment scheme as in Stage 2, 
which we call a tournament scheme. If Stage 3 is randomly selected for payment and you 
have chosen the piece rate scheme, you will receive €0.5 per correct problem solved. If you 
have chosen the tournament scheme you will receive €2 per correct problem solved, however 
only in the case that you are the winner in your group. To determine whether you are a winner 
or not, we will compare the number of correct problems you solved in Stage 3 with the 
number of correct problems solved by the other people in your group in Stage 2. This ensures 
that we are again comparing the performance of four people. 
I will now explain the rules of the fourth stage: In this stage you do not have to add 
up your numbers again. You only have to choose a payment scheme (either piece rate or 
tournament) for your performance in Stage 1. If Stage 4 is randomly selected for payment and 
you have chosen the piece rate scheme you will get €0.5 per correct problem solved in Stage 
1. If you have chosen instead the tournament scheme you receive €2 per correct problem 
solved in Stage 1, however only in the case that you are the winner in your group in Stage 1. 
Before you have to make your decision you will be shown again the number of correct 
problems solved in Stage 1. 
Finally we kindly ask you to answer two assessment questions. For each correct 
assessment you will receive another €0.5. 
Question 1: In your opinion, how did you rank in your group in Stage 1? 




A2. Instructions for the running task (script for verbal explanation) 
(Explanation in front of the whole group.) Welcome to our game. You will have the 
chance to participate today in a kind of “children’s Olympic game” in which you can earn all 
sorts of prizes. The game consists of two stages. In each stage you can gather points which 
you can then exchange for prizes at the end of the game. For each point you will get one prize. 
Let’s have a look at the prizes and see whether you like them. We have stickers, marbles, 
sweets etc. (Leave room for questions.)   31
I will now explain the rules of the first stage: You have to run as fast as you can 
from here (point to the start) to the end (show the goal). We will measure your time with this 
stopwatch and make a note. Each child will run once on his/her own and we will note the 
running time of the child. After each child has run once we will form two equally sized 
groups. All the children who ran very, very fast will end up in the first group. All those who 
ran a little bit slower will end up in the second group. If you end up in the very, very fast 
group, you will earn two points. If you end up in the slower group, you will earn one point. 
The starting signal is: “Ready, steady, go!” 
 
(Individual explanation after the first stage.) 
Question 1: In your opinion, in which group will you end up (in the very, very fast group or in 
the slower group)? 
Question 2: Do you like the prizes? 
I will now explain the rules of the second stage: In this stage you will have to run again from 
the start to the end. If you want you can run again on your own. If you choose to run on your 
own you will receive two points if you are very, very fast (like the children in the very, very 
fast group). If you are a little bit slower (like the children in the slower group) you will earn 
one point. You also can choose to run against a child from your group (a child who is 
approximately as fast as you). You will earn four points, if you are the first to cross the finish 
line and your running time is very, very fast (as fast as the running time of the children in the 
very, very fast group). You will earn two points, if you are the first to cross the finish line but 
your running time is a little bit slower (as fast as the running time of the children in the slower 
group). However, if you are the second person to cross the finish line you will receive no 
points. Could you please repeat the rules of the game? (Child has to repeat the rules.) 
Question 3: Do you want to run on your own in Stage 2 or in competition against another 
child? 
Question 4: (After the child has made the decision): In your opinion, will you be the first or 
the second person to cross the finish line? (If the child chose to run on his/her own: In your 
opinion, if you had to compete against another child, would you have been the first or the 
second person to cross the finish line?) 
All children receive their feedback only at the end of both rounds. 
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Appendix B – Additional Analyses of Behavior in Experiment I 
 
Table B.1: OLS-regressions on the increase of performance from Stage 1 to 




Correct Stage 2/Correct Stage 1 
 (1a)  (1b) 
Age -0.011  -0.012 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
Female 0.023  -0.008 
 (0.041)  (0.053) 
Single-Sex   -0.009 
   (0.050) 
Single-Sex*female   0.060 
   (0.078) 
# Observations    712    712 
R-squared 0.00  0.00 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table B.2: Ordered probit regressions on expected rank in Stage 1 of Experiment I 
Explanatory Dependent  variable 
Variables  Expected rank Stage 1 
Female  0.376  **  0.450  **  0.382  **  0.455  ** 
 (0.084)  (0.114)  (0.085)  (0.113) 
Correct 1  -0.207  **  -0.207  **  -0.207  **  -0.207  ** 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Age  0.179  **  0.177  **  0.179  **  0.177  ** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Single-Sex   0.108    0.112 
   (0.134)    (0.134) 
Single-Sex*female   -0.169    -0.168 
   (0.171)    (0.171) 
Risk     -0.072  -0.072 
     (0.167)  (0.169) 
# Observations    717    717    717    717 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table B.3: Ordered probit regressions on expected rank in Stage 2 of Experiment I 
Explanatory Dependent  variable 
Variables  Expected rank Stage 2 
Female  0.366  **  0.426  **  0.357  **  0.419  ** 
 (0.086)  (0.119)  (0.087)  (0.120) 
Correct 2  -0.159  **  -0.160  **  -0.159  **  -0.160  ** 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Correct 2 – Correct 1  -0.086  **  -0.086  **  -0.086  **  -0.086  ** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Age  0.108  **  0.107  **  0.107  **  0.107  ** 
 (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021) 
Single-Sex   0.079    0.073 
   (0.142)    (0.142) 
Single-Sex*female  -0.135   -0.136 
   (0.177)    (0.177) 
Risk     0.099  0.103 
     (0.169)  (0.170) 
# Observations    717    717    717    717 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
   33
 
Table B.4: Probit regressions on the choice of compensation scheme in Stage 4 of 
Experiment I 
Explanatory Dependent  variable 
Variables  Choosing tournament in Stage 4 
Age  -0.015  *  -0.013  *  -0.026  **  -0.025  ** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Female  -0.145  **  -0.153  **  -0.149  **  -0.162  ** 
 (0.033)  (0.045)  (0.033)  (0.046) 
Single-Sex   -0.036    -0.045 
   (0.051)    (0.050) 
Single-Sex*female   0.029    0.038 
   (0.068)    (0.069) 
Correct 1      0.019  **  0.019  ** 
     (0.006)  (0.006) 
# Observations    717    717    717    717 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
The table presents marginal effects of the coefficient. 
 
Table B.4 - continued 
Explanatory Dependent  variable 
Variables  Choosing tournament in Stage 4 
Age -0.015    *  -0.013 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
Female  -0.116  **  -0.123  ** 
 (0.034)  (0.047) 
Single-Sex   -0.049 
   (0.051) 
Single-Sex*female   0.031 
   (0.069) 
Correct 1  0.002  0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
Rank 1 = 1
†  0.444  **  0.445  ** 
 (0.054)  (0.055) 
# Observations    717    717 
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
† This variable takes on the value 1 if a subject expects to be ranked first in Stage 1 
(the expected rank is equal to one), and 0 otherwise. 
The table presents marginal effects of the coefficient. 
 
 
 